One or the other of these questions surely must be answered yes, the other no. The first question, if answered in the affirmative, presents a conclusion that defies all that we know, all that we experience, all that we can test or verify and requires a blind leap of faith to an usupportable conclusion. The second question, if answered in the affirmative, is consistent with everything that we can observe and test and can be reasonably accepted. There is evidence for design, not for random chance. Investigating the nature of the cause or agency follows from the conclusion, but the conclusion itself, that there must be a cause, a designer, is consistent with what we know apart from any consideration of the nature of the cause.

The nature of the cause, the idea of an eternal transcendant God is then reasonable and consistent with the design argument itself, the design argument does not mitigate against the eternal nature of God. We again have two basic possibilities. Either nothing is eternal (nothing has always existed), or something is (something has always existed). If nothing is eternal, then we are back to a causeless universe that somehow sprang into existence by accident (or else the predecessor of the universe did so), which defies all that we know and can test. Concluding that nothing is eternal puts us back into the unreasonable position of denying the verifiable in favor of a blind leap of faith. On the other hand, if we conclude that something is eternal (the only other choice) then we can ask questions about the nature of the eternal something. We know that it cannot be matter or any of the quantifiable aspects of the physical universe, despite the best efforts of science to prove otherwise, because they all had a determinable point of origin. Following this line of reasoning with what we do know, we can arrive at the conclusion that there is an eternal intelligent omnipotent designer, God, whose necessary attributes are those described in the Christian scriptures. The argument from design does not contradict the necessity of an eternal (without beginning) first cause, rather it demands an adequate first cause, which can only be an eternal being, God.

So how do you handle the fact that your arguement against order stemming from nothing negates the idea of God just being, with no one before him? It just seems like a pradox or something similiar to use such logic to prove God exists, but then not apply the same idea to God himself.